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The Harmonizing Directive of Section 1508: 
Foreign Case Law’s Role in Interpreting Chapter 




Abstract: The number of insolvency cases with cross-border aspects continues to 
rise. In many of these cases, a country’s adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency governs. The United States adopted the Model Law 
into federal statute through Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Section 
1508 of the Bankruptcy Code requires U.S. courts to consider the international 
origin of the Model Law and the need to promote its uniform application in 
Chapter 15’s interpretation. The legislative history of Chapter 15’s adoption 
reveals that non-U.S. sources, including non-U.S. court decisions, facilitate this 
uniform application. Courts have recognized Section 1508’s directive, but a 
method of interpretation that fully satisfies the directive, particularly with 
respect to the consideration of foreign case law, has yet to be articulated 
clearly. This Note addresses that issue and proposes the level of consideration 
U.S. courts should give the case law of other Model Law countries when 
interpreting Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.  
  
 
* J.D., Northwestern University, 2016; M.B.A., Louisiana State University, 2010; B.S., Louisiana Tech 
University, 2008. I would like to thank Professor Bruce Markell for his invaluable guidance and 
feedback. This Note is lovingly dedicated to the memory of Renn Brasher, whose beautiful spirit is my 
greatest inspiration. Errors in this paper are my own. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic globalization and technological innovation have fueled the 
substantial growth of business across national borders.
1
 This exchange of 
goods, services, and capital has provoked an increasingly complex 
integration of financial, legal, and political spheres.
2
 With this integration 
has come not only great wealth but also profound implications in the 
context of business failure.
3
 As the frequency of business insolvencies with 
international aspects
4
 has inevitably and dramatically increased,
5
 the 
insolvency laws of multiple countries have been forced to interact more and 
more.
6
 This has not been without issue; for although investment can cross 
borders fluidly, bankruptcy remains largely territorial.
7
 National insolvency 
laws are often ill-equipped to handle cross-border insolvency cases.
8
 This 
shortcoming results in insufficient and inharmonious legal approaches 
which inhibit fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvency 
cases.
9
 This inefficiency impedes the rescue of financially distressed 
businesses, hampers the security of the assets of the debtor, and stymies the 






 Aaron L. Hammer & Matthew E. McClintock, Understanding Chapter 15 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code: Everything You Need to Know About Cross-Border Insolvency Legislation in the 
United States, 14 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 257, 258 (2008) (“Economic globalization . . . has vastly 
increased the number of companies that operate, own assets, or otherwise conduct business in multiple 
countries.”); Elizabeth Buckel, Curbing Comity: The Increasingly Expansive Public Policy Exception of 
Chapter 15, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1281, 1282 (2013). 
 
2
 Buckel, supra note 1, at 1283. 
 
3
 Hammer & McClintock, supra note 1, at 258. 
 
4
 This Note uses the terms “insolvency” and “insolvency proceeding” to describe all formal 
liquidation and reorganization proceedings. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (2012 & Supp. 2014) (defining 
“insolvent” in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to mean, inter alia, “a financial condition such that the sum of 
such entity’s debts is greater than all of such entity’s property, at a fair valuation”). This Note uses the 
term “cross-border insolvency” to refer to an insolvency proceeding involving more than one country.  
For a comparative look at the usage of these and similar terms, see Kent Anderson, The Cross-Border 
Insolvency Paradigm: A Defense of the Modified Universal Approach Considering the Japanese 
Experience, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 679, 680 n.2 (2000). 
 
5
 U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-
BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, at 20, U.N. Sales No. 
E.14.V.2 (2014) [hereinafter MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT]; Hammer & McClintock, supra 
note 1, at 258 (“Where ten years ago, insolvencies and reorganizations with significant international 
connections were relatively rare, today, it is increasingly unusual to find a major case without at least 
some international aspects.”); DANIEL M. GLOSBAND ET AL., GUIDE TO CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1 (2008). 
 
6
 See GLOSBAND ET AL., supra note 5, at 1.  
 
7
 See Alexandra C.C. Ragan, COMI Strikes a Discordant Note: Why U.S. Courts Are Not in 
Complete Harmony Despite Chapter 15 Directives, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 117, 118 (2010). 
 
8
 MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 20. 
 
9
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To address the inadequacies of national insolvency laws, the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL) promulgated the 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Insolvency Model Law) in 1997.
11
 
The Insolvency Model Law consists of procedural rules for enacting 
countries to follow in cross-border insolvency cases.
12
 The United States 
incorporated the Insolvency Model Law into federal statute via Chapter 15 
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Code) and adopted its main provisions, 
including a directive to consider the Insolvency Model Law’s “international 
origin” and the need to promote uniformity in its application.
13
 The 
legislative history of Chapter 15’s adoption reveals that non-U.S. sources, 
including non-U.S. court decisions interpreting the Insolvency Model Law, 
facilitate its uniform application.
14
 
However, the provision does not specify the degree of consideration or 
weight to be placed on the court decisions of implementing states
15
 when 
interpreting the Insolvency Model Law.
16
 Courts have recognized the 
Code’s directive to interpret the Insolvency Model Law in light of its 
international origin and the need to promote its uniform application,
17
 but 
ultimately, courts have failed to articulate a method of interpretation that 







 Id. at 19–21. 
 
12
 Id. at 19, 25. 
 
13
 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (2012 & Supp. 2014); H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 309 (2005). 
 
14
 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 109–10 (2005). 
 
15
 This Note uses the term “implementing states” to describe those countries or jurisdictions, 
including the United States, which have enacted the Insolvency Model Law in some form. Those 
countries are as follows: Australia (2008), Benin (2015), Burkina Faso (2015), Cameroon (2015), 
Canada (2005), Central African Republic (2015), Chad (2015), Chile (2013), Colombia (2006), 
Comoros (2015), Congo (2015), Cote d’Ivoire (2015), Democratic Republic of the Congo (2015), 
Equatorial Guinea (2015), Gabon (2015), Greece (2010), Guinea (2015), Guinea-Bissau (2015), Japan 
(2000), Kenya (2015), Mali (2015), Mauritius (2009), Mexico (2000), Montenegro (2002), New Zealand 
(2006), Niger (2015), Philippines (2010), Poland (2003), Republic of Korea (2006), Romania (2002), 
Senegal (2015), Serbia (2004), Seychelles (2013), Slovenia (2007), South Africa (2000), Togo (2015), 
Uganda (2011), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (including British Virgin Islands 
(2003) and Great Britain (2005)), United States (2005), and Vanuatu (2013).  Status: UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, UNCITRAL (1997), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral 
/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2015). The term 
implementing states may also be used to refer to countries or jurisdictions which have enacted other 
uniform acts or conventions. When used in that context, the relevant act or convention will be specified. 
 
16
 Although the exact weight to be placed on these cases is not explicitly stated, Congress 
provides much information to suggest its intention with respect to the matter. This information will be 
covered in greater detail throughout this Note.  
 
17
 Hammer & McClintock, supra note 1, at 259, 262 (“Early cases interpreting Chapter 15 have 




 Cf. V. Susanne Cook, The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A 
Mandate to Abandon Legal Ethnocentricity, 16 J.L. & COM. 257 (1997) (explaining courts’ difficulty in 
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As the Insolvency Model Law matures and is adopted by more 
countries, the occurrence of cases requiring Insolvency Model Law 
interpretation will only increase,
19
 and the recent Australian case, De Akers 
ex rel. Saad Investments Co. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation 
(Saad Investments), provides a noteworthy example.
20
 In Akers, the 
Australian appellate court interpreted particular provisions of the 
Insolvency Model Law to determine the local remedies available to a local 
Australian creditor whose rights to collect in the debtor’s main proceeding 
were effectively extinguished.
21
 The case presents an Insolvency Model 
Law interpretation issue which is not difficult to imagine arising in a case 
under Chapter 15 in the United States where, for whatever reason, a U.S. 
creditor has no claim against a foreign debtor with assets in the United 
States under the insolvency proceedings of another country.
22
 Yet guidance 
on the proper weight a U.S. court should afford a case such as Akers is 
unclear; therefore, this Note proposes the level of consideration U.S. courts 
should give the case law of fellow implementing countries when 
interpreting the Insolvency Model Law. 
This Note contends that Section 1508 directs U.S. courts to consider 
the case law of implementing states when facing a question of interpretation 
under Chapter 15 of the Code if that foreign case law interprets provisions 
of the Insolvency Model Law similar to those provisions contained in 
Chapter 15. Furthermore, if U.S. courts deviate from that case law, they 
should explain the departure. Part II discusses the general uniform approach 
of the Insolvency Model Law and details its adoption in the United States. 
Part III explains contexts in which case law is more than merely 
persuasive—it has a heightened persuasiveness—and describes the 
 
approaching a similar provision of interpretation in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods).   
 
19
 Thirty-two jurisdictions have enacted the Insolvency Model Law since the United States, 
including Canada and Great Britain in the same year as the United States. See supra note 15 for the 
complete list along with the year of enactment. 
 
20
 De Akers ex rel. Saad Inv. Co. Ltd. v Deputy Comm’r of Taxation [2014] FCAFC 57 (Austl.). 
 
21
 Id.; Cross-Border Insolvency, HWL EBSWORTH LAWYERS (July 22, 2014), 
http://www.hwlebsworth.com.au/latest-news-a-publications/publications/insolvency-and-securities-




 De Akers [2014] FCAFC 57, ¶ 115 (framing the facts in the case as but one iteration of the 
underlying issue. “The present particular circumstance involves a claimed revenue debt. Other examples 
of debts unenforceable in the centre of main interests, but enforceable in the forum of recognition, are 
not difficult to hypothesise. The debt may be an unenforceable penalty in the centre of main interests, 
but not locally. The jurisdiction of the centre of main interests may have a law discriminating against or 
refusing to recognise the commercial interests or rights of citizens or companies of a particular state, 
whether because of a state of affairs such as belligerency, or because of some other reason. The local 
(recognising) state may have no such attitude. Thus, whilst we are dealing here with revenue debt, the 
problem need not necessarily be so framed.”) (emphasis added). 
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treatment of such case law by other courts in those contexts.
23
 Part III 
asserts that the uniform approach of the Insolvency Model Law and its aim 
to harmonize among implementing states renders case law which interprets 
it heightened persuasive authority. Thus, the case law of implementing 
states should be treated as heightened persuasive authority by U.S. courts; 
therefore, when interpreting Chapter 15 of the Code, U.S. courts must 
consider the case law of implementing states when that case law interprets 
provisions of the Insolvency Model Law similar to those provisions 
contained in Chapter 15. Also, if U.S. courts do not follow the case law, 
they should explain their departure. Part IV establishes that the heightened 
persuasive treatment of case law of implementing states must operate 
within limits. Part V returns to the Akers case and analyzes the court’s 
decision under the framework established in previous sections of the Note. 
Part VI explores the practical issues inherent in the consideration of foreign 
case law. Part VII concludes by reinforcing the necessity of proper 
consideration for foreign case law in interpreting Chapter 15 of the Code.  
 II. THE UNICTRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY AND CHAPTER 15 OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY 
CODE 
 A.  The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
Originally adopted by UNCITRAL in 1997, the Insolvency Model 
Law is a tool for countries to better handle cross-border insolvency 
proceedings.
24
 By reflecting best practices in cross-border insolvency, the 
Insolvency Model Law assists implementing states in modernizing, 
harmonizing, and increasing the fairness of their insolvency laws.
25
 The 
Insolvency Model Law addresses situations where the debtor has assets in 
more than one country or where creditors of the debtor exist in a country 
other than the seat of the main insolvency proceeding.
26
 The Insolvency 
Model Law aims to (i) encourage cooperation between countries, (ii) 
provide legal certainty for trade and investment, (iii) protect and maximize 




 The phrase “heightened persuasive authority” is used to connote a higher level of persuasive 
authority and is described in more detail in Part III. 
 
24
 MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 19.  The Insolvency Model Law 
acknowledges that liquidation and reorganization in some jurisdictions might not be conducted under 
law that is labelled as insolvency law (e.g., company law) but that addresses insolvency or severe 
financial distress nonetheless.  U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL MODEL 
LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: THE JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, ¶ 79, U.N. Sales No. V.14-00242 
(2013) [hereinafter JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE]. 
 
25
 MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 19. 
 
26
 Id.  
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and other interested parties including the debtor, and (v) facilitate the rescue 




The Insolvency Model Law does not purport to be substantive 
insolvency law; rather, it acts as a procedural framework for increasing 
cooperation among jurisdictions.
28
 The Insolvency Model Law, thus, 
provides rules concerning (1) the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
insolvency proceedings, (2) foreign representatives’ access to courts of 
implementing states, (3) the rights of foreign creditors, (4) coordination of 
multiple insolvency proceedings, (5) cooperation among courts, (6) 




To date, legislation based on the Insolvency Model Law has been 
adopted in thirty-two jurisdictions.
30
 In incorporating the text of the 
Insolvency Model Law into its body of law, an implementing state may 
modify or omit some of the provisions of the Insolvency Model Law.
31
 
However, adopting the Insolvency Model Law into a country’s existing 
legal system with “as few changes as possible” is recommended.
32
 
 B.  Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
The United States adopted the Insolvency Model Law into Chapter 15 
of the Code under Title VIII of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005.
33
 Chapter 15 replaced former Section 
304, which was enacted in 1978 and provided specific procedures for 
obtaining relief in U.S. courts by foreign representatives to facilitate a 
foreign insolvency proceeding.
34




 Id. at 32. 
 
28
 Id. at 19; see Andre J. Berends, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A 
Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 309, 321 (1998) (“The Model Law does not 
modify the existing material rules concerning insolvency proceedings in the enacting State.”). 
 
29
 MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 20; Berends, supra note 28, at 312.  
The Insolvency Model Law is intended to apply to a number of situations arising in cross-border 
insolvency proceedings such as (1) an inward-bound request for recognition of a foreign proceeding, (2) 
an outward-bound request from a court or an administrator in the implementing state for recognition of 
an insolvency proceeding commenced under the laws of the implementing state, (3) coordination of 
concurrent proceedings in two or more countries, and (4) participation of foreign creditors in insolvency 
proceedings taking place in the implementing state. Buckel, supra note 1, at 1289 (citing BOB WESSELS 
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY MATTERS 240 (2009)). 
 
30
 See supra note 15 for more information on enacting countries. 
 
31
 MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 25. 
 
32
 Id.  
 
33
 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, § 801(a), 
119 Stat. 23, 135–45 (2005). 
 
34
 Alesia Ramney-Marinelli, Overview of Chapter 15 Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases, 
82 AM. BANKR. L. J. 269, 269 (2008). 
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Insolvency Model Law with only minor changes to reflect U.S. references 
and vernacular
35
 and thus aligns with the procedural law of most enacting 
countries.
36
 Chapter 15’s objectives are quite similar to those of the 
Insolvency Model Law but with greater specificity as to desired cooperation 
among U.S. and foreign representatives and authorities.
37
 Chapter 15 
primarily applies in four situations.
38
 The first two situations involve 
assistance in connection with an insolvency proceeding. Either assistance is 
sought in the United States by a foreign court or a foreign representative in 
connection with a foreign insolvency proceeding, or assistance is sought in 
another country in connection with a case under the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code.
39
 The third scenario arises when a foreign insolvency proceeding and 
a U.S. bankruptcy proceeding involving the same debtor are concurrently 
pending.
40
 Finally, the fourth situation concerns foreign creditors or other 
parties in another country that have an interest in requesting the 
commencement of a U.S. bankruptcy case or in participating in such a 
case.
41
 Thus, Chapter 15 is the sole avenue of access to an ancillary 
insolvency proceeding in the United States for a U.S. multinational 
corporation with an insolvency commenced elsewhere.
42




 Buckel, supra note 1, at 1293 (citing Kevin J. Beckering, United States Cross-Border 
Corporate Insolvency: The Impact of Chapter 15 on Comity and the New Legal Environment, 14 L. & 
BUS. REV. AM. 281, 282 (2008)). For example, regarding Section 1501, the report states that “it largely 
tracks the language of the Model Law with appropriate United States references,” and regarding Section 
1503, the report states that “this section is taken exactly from the Model Law with only minor 
adaptations of terminology.” H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 106, 107 (2005). Also, regarding Section 
1508, the report states that “[c]hanges to the language were made to express the concepts more clearly in 
United States vernacular.” Id. at 109. 
 
36
 Buckel, supra note 1, at 1289 (citing Beckering, supra note 35, at 282). 
 
37
 Compare the drafting of 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (2012 & Supp. 2014) (stating one of the 
objectives of the law is cooperation between (i) U.S. courts, U.S. Trustees, trustees, debtors and debtors-
in-possession, and examiners and (ii) courts and other competent authorities of foreign countries 
involved in cross-border insolvency cases) with the drafting of MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO 
ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 3 (stating one of the objectives of the law is “cooperation between the 
courts and other competent authorities of this State and foreign States involved in cases of cross-border 
insolvency”). Other objectives of Chapter 15 are to provide legal certainty for trade and investment, 
protect and maximize the value of debtors’ assets, fairly administer the interests of creditors and other 
interested parties, including the debtor, and facilitate the rescue of financially troubled businesses to 
protect investment and preserve employment. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a). Other objectives of the Insolvency 
Model Law are discussed in Part I of this Note.  
 
38












 John J. Chung, The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Step Toward the Erosion of 
National Sovereignty, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 89, 89 (2006); see also Ramney-Marinelli, supra note 
34, at 271 (explaining Congress’s intent to make Chapter 15 “the exclusive door to ancillary assistance 
to foreign proceedings.”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 110 (2005)). “Generally, a chapter 15 
case is ancillary to a primary proceeding brought in another country, typically the debtor’s home 
country. As an alternative, the debtor or a creditor may commence a full chapter 7 or chapter 11 case in 
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means of access to an ancillary insolvency proceeding in the United States 
for a foreign corporation with assets or operations in the United States.
43
 
 III. HEIGHTENED PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY AND CASE LAW 
UNDER SECTION 1508 
As the use of Chapter 15 continues to increase, U.S. courts will be 
called upon to interpret its provisions more and more. Thus, the treatment 
of case law of implementing states must be addressed. This Part proposes 
the proper treatment of such case law by arguing that the case law is 
heightened persuasive authority. First, this Part explains heightened 
persuasive authority, explores contexts in which case law assumes 
heightened persuasiveness, and describes the treatment of case law in those 
contexts. Then the Part argues that the uniform approach of the Insolvency 
Model Law and its goal to harmonize among its implementing states is also 
a context for heightened persuasive authority. Finally, the Part concludes by 
setting forth the treatment case law of implementing states should receive 
by U.S. courts. 
 A. Understanding Heightened Persuasive Authority 
In reaching their decisions, courts may consider the content as well as 





a classification which includes those resources that a court may choose to 
follow if it finds the reasoning or conclusion convincing.
46
 Treatises, law 
review articles, and decisions of courts in other jurisdictions are types of 
persuasive authority.
47
 Persuasive authority is contrasted with mandatory or 
binding authority. Courts must follow binding authority.
48
 Persuasive 
authority by its very nature is not binding; a court is not required to follow 
 
the United States if the assets in the United States are sufficiently complex to merit a full-blown 
domestic bankruptcy case.” Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter15.aspx (citing 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1520(c)) (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
 
43
 See Chung, supra note 42, at 89; see also Ramney-Marinelli, supra note 34, at 271. 
 
44
 See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1934, 1940 (2008). 
 
45
 From this point forward in this Note, the term persuasive authority and persuasive source will 
be used interchangeably. Furthermore, if the Note refers to courts as persuasive authority, the decisions 
of those courts are implicated as persuasive authority too since they embody the reasoning and status of 
the authoring court. The significance of reasoning and status will be explored further in this Part.  
 
46
 Schauer, supra note 44, at 1940. 
 
47
 Chad Flanders, Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 55, 63–64 (2009). 
 
48
 Schauer, supra note 44, at 1940 (“Mandatory authorities, according to the standard account 
drummed into the minds of lawyers from their first year of law school on, are ones that bind a court to 
follow them.”). 
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However, there are certain contexts in which a court, though not 
bound to follow a persuasive authority, may nonetheless have a 
strong, overarching reason to do so.
50
 Namely, courts in these 
contexts are trying to make their decisions consistent with the 
conclusion of the persuasive authority.
51
 Indeed, a great concern for 
uniformity in the law pervades many of the most visible contexts
52
 in 
which this desire for consistency exists.
53
 In these situations, the 
persuasive authority assumes a heightened persuasiveness, a 
persuasiveness greater than that of other persuasive sources.
54
 
 1. Heightened Persuasive Authority—For Case Law Only 
A source’s heightened persuasiveness relates to its status, particularly 
with respect to concerns for uniformity in the law.
55
 That is to say, only 




 Brian D. Lepard, Is the United States Obligated to Drive on the Right? A Multidisciplinary 
Inquiry into the Normative Authority of Contemporary International Law Using the Arm’s Length 
Standard as a Case Study, 10 DUKE J. COMP & INT’L L. 43, 91 (1999); see Schauer, supra note 44, at 
1940. (“[M]andatory (or binding) authorities are commonly distinguished from persuasive authorities.  
Mandatory authorities . . . are ones that bind a court to follow them. . . . [T]his binding obligation . . . is 
in contrast . . . with a court’s discretion to choose whether to follow a persuasive authority . . . .”).  
 
50
 Mayo Moran, Influential Authority and the Estoppel-Like Effect of International Law 5 (U. 
Toronto, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 03-05, 2005), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=785545 (“Judges often feel constrained to pay heed 
to what are best described as mandatory values. These values exert a kind of demand . . . [such that] they 
do not simply persuade, they compel.”); see, e.g., Ruth A. Moyer, Disagreement About Disagreement: 
The Effect of a Circuit Split or “Other Circuit” Authority on the Availability of Federal Habeas Relief 
for State Convicts, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 832, 838 (2014) (“Citing the value of ‘uniformity,’ federal courts 
are often reluctant to create a circuit split.”). 
 
51
 Flanders, supra note 47, at 75. 
 
52
 Two of the most visible of these contexts will be explored later in this Part. To preview them 
here, they are (i) when U.S. circuit courts cite other circuit courts, not merely for the informational or 
persuasive value, but because they seek to avoid a circuit split, and (ii) when U.S. state courts aim to 
harmonize their interpretation of state “uniform acts” with other states based on the fact that those states 
have adopted the same uniform act. 
 
53
 Flanders, supra note 47, at 75. 
 
54
 Authorities with this heightened persuasiveness have been referred to as “super-persuasive” 
authorities. Flanders, supra note 47, at 74 (“[T]hese . . . ‘super-persuasive’ authorities . . . have an 
additional weight, beyond their persuasiveness . . . .”); see Lepard, supra note 49, at 91 (explaining that 
certain persuasive authority imposes an obligation to afford it “great weight in decision making”) 
(internal quotes omitted); Alice Osman, Demanding Attention: The Roles of Unincorporated 
International Instruments in Judicial Reasoning, 12 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 345, 350 (2014) (explaining 
that “some sources of persuasive authority . . . are only persuasive,” but “[o]ther sources, however, seem 
to demand attention” and referring to these other sources as “influential authority”); see Flanders, supra 
note 47, at 75–76.   
 
55
 Flanders, supra note 47, at 75. 
36_2_4_CLEMENTS FINAL (DO NOT  DELETE) 3/14/2016  3:18 PM 
The Harmonizing Directive of Section 1508 
36:435 (2016) 
445 
can carry heightened persuasiveness.
56
 Thus, heightened persuasive 
authority is limited to court decisions because courts have decision-making 
power (unlike other forms of persuasive authority such as treatises, law 
review articles, and Internet sources).
57
 While sources like law review 
articles may influence uniformity in the law, they do not have the power to 
make legal decisions that affect it; courts do.
58
   
Decision-making power is necessary for heightened persuasiveness, 
but it is not sufficient.
59
 Not all courts are heightened persuasive authorities 
despite their ability to make decisions.
60
 Rather, heightened persuasive 
authorities share the distinction of making decisions that have some 
harmonizing value.
61
 In other words, what brings a court decision with 
heightened persuasiveness into the “territory outside of conventional 
persuasive authorities” is another court’s citation to that decision in order to 
make its own decision consistent with it.
62
 “The desire to create an actual 
uniformity in the law transforms some authorities” into heightened 
persuasive ones.
63
 The extra weight of heightened persuasive authorities, 
thus, derives from their virtue of being a court that decides law in a context 
where uniformity or consistency is valued.
64
 They are heightened 
persuasive authorities by virtue of what they are (courts that decide issues 
under similar law
65






 See id. 
 
57
 Id. at 58 (“[D]ecisions from other courts outside the jurisdiction of the deciding court are 
treated as having more weight than other authorities—such as law review articles or treatises.”); see 
Schauer, supra note 44, at 1935 (“The force of an authoritative directive [such as a court decision] 
comes not from its content, but from its source.”). 
 
58
 See Secondary Sources: ALRs, Encyclopedias, Law Reviews, Restatements, & Treatises, HARV. 
L. SCH., http://guides.library.harvard.edu/content.php?pid=103327&sid=1030214 (last visited Mar. 31, 
2015) (explaining that law review articles are “valuable for the depth in which they analyze and critique 
legal topics” on which courts have ruled or will rule). 
 
59
 See Flanders, supra note 47, at 74–76.  Flanders gives examples of courts acting as heightened-
persuasive authorities and suggests that not all courts fit the bill of heightened-persuasive authority. Id. 
 
60
 See id.  
 
61
 Id. at 75; see Rene David, The Methods of Unification, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 13, 15 (1968) 
(describing that harmonization of laws entails “effectuating an understanding about the significance of 
certain concepts” including “the recognition of authoritative sources”). 
 
62
 Flanders, supra note 47, at 75; see Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1143, 
1201 (2006) (“For a persuasive precedent to be authoritative . . . it involves some degree of ceding 
decisionmaking to another because of the authority of the other.”). 
 
63
 Flanders, supra note 47, at 79. 
 
64
 Id. at 74. 
 
65
 Primarily, contexts where uniformity or consistency is valued involve deciding issues under 
similar law. This concept will be explored in this Part below. 
 
66
 See Moyer, supra note 50, at 839 (discussing in the case of federal circuit courts, “it is the very 
existence of . . . the ‘other circuit’ authority that becomes substantively determinative in the federal 
court’s reasoning and, ultimately, its disposition of the issue of law.”); Flanders, supra note 47, at 75; 
see also Schauer, supra note 44, at 1943 (“Many—perhaps even most—judicial uses of so-called 
persuasive authority seem to stem from authority rather than persuasion.”). 
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when looking at the decisions of these courts, other courts consider not only 
the reasoning of their conclusion (as they would with any persuasive 




Heightened persuasive authority, then, refers to a grade of persuasive 
authority.
68
 In a hierarchy of persuasive authority, it ranks at the top, being 
the most persuasive.
69
 “The norms of judge craft require that persuasive 
authorities be dealt with appropriately.”
70
 This means that heightened 
persuasive authorities must be confronted by courts in making their 
decisions precisely because of the heightened persuasive authority’s 
status.
71
 Essentially, the power of heightened persuasive authorities closely 
resembles the role of past decisions of the same court or higher courts, both 
binding sources of law.
72
 As heightened persuasive authority is more akin to 
binding than persuasive authority, courts cannot simply ignore it.
73
 The 
heightened persuasive authority must be acknowledged.
74
 Additionally, if a 
court determines that the heightened persuasive authority should not be 
followed, there should at least be a clear explanation why.
75
 The heightened 
persuasive authority should receive an acknowledgement and rebuttal, 
showing why the court decided not to follow the decision, particularly 
given its heightened persuasiveness.
76




 Flanders, supra note 47, at 74. 
 
68
 Sullivan, supra note 62, at 1201 (“The notion of authority being ‘persuasive’ beyond its 
inherent power to persuade . . . explains what is otherwise mysterious—the phenomenon that might be 
called ‘graded persuasiveness.’”); see Flanders, supra note 47, at 63. 
 
69
 See Flanders, supra note 47, at 63. In his ordering, Flanders ranks other courts outside the 
deciding court’s own jurisdiction at the top of the ordering.  Id. Yet, Flanders goes on to point out that 
even within this top ordering some authority can be more persuasive than others. Id. at 74–75.  
 
70
 Sullivan, supra note 62, at 1206. 
 
71
 Id. at 1205 (arguing that “at least those [sources] that grade high enough on the scale of 
persuasion, must be confronted precisely because the authority is an authority,” in other words, a court 
that makes decisions). 
 
72
 Flanders, supra note 47, at 74. 
 
73
 Sullivan, supra note 62, at 1206 (“In short, persuasive precedents can be rejected, but they 
cannot be ignored.”). 
 
74
 See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating “we would consider it bad 
form to ignore . . . authority by failing even to acknowledge its existence”). 
 
75
 Id. (“[I]t is well understood that—in the absence of binding precedent—courts may forge a 
different path than suggested by prior authorities that have considered the issue. So long as the earlier 
authority is acknowledged and considered, courts are deemed to have complied with their .  
responsibilities.”) (emphasis added); Cf. Flanders, supra note 47, at 61 (describing that binding authority 
cannot simply be noted and then departed from. It must receive an acknowledgement and a rebuttal, 
showing why the decision no longer has any force.). 
 
76
 See Flanders, supra note 47, at 78 (“[T]here is a pull towards conformity with other courts, and 
courts who drift from that pull are usually thought to have to explain why, or at least to acknowledge the 
disagreement.”). “The decisions of other courts [even if not very persuasive in their reasoning] may 
deserve recognition and even consideration if the cases are very closely related or on point, and there are 
strong reasons for uniformity or consistency in that area of law.” See id. at 84; see also Sullivan, supra 
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heightened persuasiveness, like traditionally persuasive authority, 
ultimately is not binding.
77
 Courts are not in legal error if they do not 
choose to follow authorities with heightened persuasiveness.
78
 
 2. Two Tales of Heightened Persuasive Authority 
As mentioned earlier, a significant concern for uniformity in the law 
infuses many of the most apparent contexts in which heightened 
persuasiveness dwells.
79
 Two primary contexts for heightened 
persuasiveness are as follows: 
(1) When U.S. circuit courts cite other circuit courts, not merely 
for informational or persuasive value, but because they seek to 
avoid a circuit split, and
80
  
(2) When U.S. state courts aim to harmonize their interpretation 
of state uniform acts with other states based on the fact that those 
states have adopted the same uniform act.
81
 
A clear example of heightened persuasiveness is found within the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals.
82
 Circuit courts consider the decisions of other circuit 
courts on a similar issue before making a decision.
83
 The courts are under 
no obligation to adhere to the decisions of “sister courts,”
84
 yet the courts 
maintain that those decisions deserve “great weight and precedential 
value.”
85




note 62, at 1205–06 (“A court facing such a high-value persuasive precedent will often go to great 
lengths to distinguish it . . . [a]nd, when such prior authority cannot be distinguished (at least in a way 
that is intellectually satisfying to the court), it will usually feel compelled to explain why it has reached a 
different result.”). Compare the notion that heighted persuasive authority, which is not followed, should 
“receive an acknowledgement and rebuttal, showing why the court decides not to follow the decision” 
with the point that binding authority, which is not followed, “must receive an acknowledgement and 
rebuttal, showing why the decision no longer has any force. To fail to do so would . . . be a legal error.”  
Flanders, supra note 47, at 61 (emphasis added). This Note’s assertion that heightened persuasive 
authority, which is not followed, should receive an acknowledgement and rebuttal does not hinge on any 
legal error in the absence of such acknowledgement. Rather, it centers on the idea that authority with 
heightened persuasiveness gains its status from certain values, including harmonization. See Flanders, 
supra note 47, at 75. 
 
77






 Id. at 75. 
 
80
 Amelia H. Boss, The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act in a Global Environment, 37 IDAHO 
L. REV. 275, 280 (2001); Flanders, supra note 47, at 75–76; Moyer, supra note 50, at 838. 
 
81
 Boss, supra note 80, at 280; Flanders, supra note 47, at 75–76. 
 
82






 Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1578 (2008). 
 
85
 Aldens, Inc. v. Miller, 610 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1979). 
 
86
 See, e.g., Alfaro v. Comm’r, 349 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 2003) (“We are always chary to create 
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citing the importance of uniformity.
87
 Thus, the decisions of other appellate 
courts are considered not only because of their content but also because of 




Heightened persuasiveness can also be observed in the interpretation 
of uniform statutory texts across states in the United States.
89
 Through the 
enactment of uniform legislation—chiefly the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC)—state legislators have adopted statutes that encourage state courts 
to duly consider the interpretations of similar statutes in other states.
90
 State 
courts are not bound by other states’ court decisions which interpret such 
uniform acts like the UCC; however, the interpretations provided by other 
state court decisions are “extremely persuasive.”
91
 Judges express a 
“healthy respect” for the decisions of other states’ courts construing the 
UCC.
92
 An appreciation for the importance of uniformity in a national 
system of sales laws informs the judges’ approach.
93
 Other states’ court 
decisions are considered not merely due to the value of their reasoning, but 
also because of the courts’ status as courts which decide cases under a 




a circuit split.”). “[S]ome [circuit courts] go so far as to create a presumption against creating a conflict, 
claiming that they must avoid generating circuit splits unless they have a ‘compelling’ reason to do so.”  
Moyer, supra note 50, at 838 (citing Frost, supra note 84, at 1578). See, e.g., Frost, supra note 84, at 
1579 n.30 (quoting Alternative Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(“A court of appeals should always be reluctant to create a circuit split without a compelling reason . . . 
.”); Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(“[W]e decline to create a circuit split unless there is a compelling reason to do so.”); Wagner v. 
Pennwest Farm Credit, ACA, 109 F.3d 909, 912 (3d Cir. 1997) (same)). 
 
87
 Aldens, Inc., 610 F.2d at 541 (“As an appellate court, we strive to maintain uniformity in the 
law among the circuits, wherever reasoned analysis will allow . . . . Unless our . . . courts of appeals are 
thus willing to promote a cohesive network of national law, needless division and confusion will 
encourage further splintering and the formation of otherwise unnecessary additional tiers in the 
framework of our national court system.”); Moyer, supra note 50, at 838. 
 
88
 Flanders, supra note 47, at 76. 
 
89
 Boss, supra note 80, at 280 (“The concept of ‘uniform’ interpretation of statutory texts across 






 Philip T. Hackney, Is the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
Achieving Uniformity?, 61 LA. L. REV. 473, 479 (2001). 
 
92
 Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations on 
Translations, Reservations, and Other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & 
COM. 187, 215 (1998). 
 
93
 ABM Escrow Closing & Consulting, Inc. v. Matanuska Maid, Inc., 659 P.2d 1170, 1172 
(Alaska 1983) (“Although precedent from other jurisdictions is, of course, not binding upon us, we 
nonetheless are mindful of the fact that a basic objective of the Uniform Commercial Code is to promote 
national uniformity in the commercial arena and that this objective would be undermined should we 
decline to follow the stated intent of the Code’s drafters and the reasoned decisions of a number of other 
jurisdictions.”); Flechtner, supra note 92, at 215. 
 
94
 Flanders, supra note 47, at 80. 
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 B. The Insolvency Model Law and Chapter 15: Another Context for 
Heightened Persuasive Authority 




Like case law of the U.S. Courts of Appeals or the UCC, uniformity, 
or harmonization, is highly important when interpreting the Insolvency 
Model Law. The Insolvency Model Law is a uniform act by design, 
inherently urging harmonization and consistent application.
96
 The 
Insolvency Model Law emphasizes “a uniform approach to its interpretation 
based on its international origins.”
97
 The uniform approach to the 
Insolvency Model Law’s interpretation is encoded in Article 8.
98
 Article 8, 
titled “Interpretation,” reads: “In the interpretation of this Law, regard is to 
be had to its international origin and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith.”
99
 The provision’s purpose is 




Article 8 is modeled after Article 3 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce (E-Commerce Model Law).
101
 The Guide to 
Enactment for the E-Commerce Model Law reinforces the harmonizing 
purpose behind Article 8. Indeed, the expected effect of Article 3—on 










 JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 24, at 7. 
 
98






 See id. at 54; Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. on Its 30th Session, May 12–30, 1997, ¶ 174,  
U.N. Doc. A/52/17 (July 4, 1997) [hereinafter General Assembly 30th Session Report] (explaining the 
adoption of Article 8 to the Model Law); Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Grp. V (Insolvency 
Law), Rep. on Its 39th Session, Dec. 6–10, 2010, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.95 (Dec. 20, 
2010) [hereinafter Insolvency Working Group 39th Session Report] (“The importance of Article 8 to 
interpretation is noted in the decisions of a number of courts.”). 
 
101
 MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 54. (“Article 8 has been modelled 
on article 3, paragraph 1, of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce.”). Article 3 of the 
Model Law on E-Commerce reads in relevant part:  “In the interpretation of this Law, regard is to be had 
to its international origin and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of 
good faith.” U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, at 4, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.4 (1998) 
[hereinafter E-COMMERCE MODEL LAW AND GUIDE]. Article 8 of the Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency reads verbatim.  See MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 5.  Cf. U.N. 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INT’L SALE OF GOODS, at 3, U.N. Sales No. E.10.V.14 (2010) 
(“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the 
need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.”) 
[hereinafter CISG]; E-COMMERCE MODEL LAW AND GUIDE, supra note 101, at 29. 
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once incorporated in local legislation, would be interpreted only by 
reference to the concepts of local law.”
102
 The commentary to Article 3 goes 
on to state that the article serves the purpose of: 
[D]raw[ing] the attention of courts and other national authorities 
to the fact that the provisions of the Model Law (or the provisions 
of the instrument implementing the Model Law), while enacted as 
part of domestic legislation . . . should be interpreted with 
reference to its international origin in order to ensure uniformity 
in the interpretation of the Model Law in various countries.
103
 
Article 3 of the E-Commerce Model Law is in turn based on Article 7 
of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG or Convention).
104
 The Explanatory Note to the CISG explains that 
the Convention will “better fulfil[l] its purpose if it is interpreted in a 
consistent manner in all legal systems.”
105
 
As many legal writers have pointed out, this means, above all, 
that one should not read the Convention through the lenses of 
domestic law. . . . Thus, when interpreting the CISG one should 
not resort to the meaning generally attached to certain expressions 
within the ambit of a particular legal system
106
 . . . . [I]n order to 
achieve the CISG’s ultimate goal of uniform application, it is 
necessary to consider the practice of other jurisdictions, i.e., ‘what 
others have already done.”
107
  
Therefore, the intent of harmonized interpretation of the Insolvency Model 
Law, derived from a rich history of such intention in international uniform 
acts, is clearly embodied in Article 8.
108
  
Facilitating this harmonized interpretation, the Insolvency Model 




 E-COMMERCE MODEL LAW AND GUIDE, supra note 101, at 29. 
 
103
 Id. at 30 (emphasis added). 
 
104
 Id. at 29.  Other uniform law instruments contain a similar provision concerning international 
character and uniform interpretation. See, e.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations, opened for signature June 19, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, art. 18, (EC); Int’l Inst. for the 
Unification of Private Law [UNIDROIT], Convention on International Factoring, art. 4, May 28, 1988, 
27 I.L.M. 943; Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law [UNIDROIT], Convention on International 
Financial Leasing, art. 6, May 28, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 931. 
 
105
 CISG, supra note 101, at 36. 
 
106




 Id. at 247. 
 
108
 See MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 54 (“A provision similar to the 
one contained in article 8 appears in a number of private law treaties . . . . More recently, it has been 
recognized that such a provision would also be useful in a non-treaty text such as a model law on the 
basis that a State enacting a model law would have an interest in its harmonized interpretation.”). 
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in the Law’s interpretation.
109
 As a primary source, case law on the 
Insolvency Model Law is important for uniform interpretation under Article 
8.
110
 The Guide states that “harmonized interpretation” of the Insolvency 
Model Law is facilitated by the Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT) 
information system.
111
 The CLOUT system compiles abstracts of judicial 
decisions that interpret model laws created by UNCITRAL.
112
 The system’s 
purpose is to facilitate the uniform interpretation and application of model 
laws developed by UNCITRAL.
113
 
In addition to CLOUT, a digest of case law was developed to contend 
with the growing body of decisions interpreting and applying the various 
provisions of the Insolvency Model Law.
114
 The digest is maintained by 
UNCITRAL in an easily accessible form and provides greater access to 
these court decisions.
115
 Its goal is to facilitate uniformity and predictability 
with respect to the Insolvency Model Law’s interpretation.
116
 The digest of 
case law also serves as a supplement to the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency: The Judicial Perspective (Judicial Perspective).
117
 
Furthermore, jurisprudence on the Insolvency Model Law also includes 
references to the European Community’s Insolvency Regulation.
118
 
The intent of the Insolvency Model Law to be a uniform act and the 
importance of the role of jurisprudence in facilitating that intent is clear 
from the legislative history of the Model Law and Article 8 specifically.
119
 







 Insolvency Working Group 39th Session Report, supra note 100, ¶ 24. 
 
111
 Model Law and Guide to Enactment, supra note 5, at 54; U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 
[UNCITRAL], Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Secretariat Interpretation and Application of 
Selected Concepts of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency Relating to Centre of 
Main Interests (COMI), ¶ 92, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.103 (Feb. 28, 2012). More information on 




 MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 54. 
 
113
 Id. at 108. 
 
114
 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Rep. 
on Its 41st Session, Apr. 30–May 4, 2012, ¶¶ 37–38, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/742 (May 8, 2012) [hereinafter 
Insolvency Working Group 41st Session Report]; U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], 
Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Proposal for Its 41st Session, Apr. 30–May 4, 2012, ¶¶ 14–17, 




 Insolvency Working Group 41st Session Report, supra note 114, ¶¶ 37–38; Insolvency 
Working Group 41st Session Proposal, supra note 114, ¶¶ 14–17. 
 
116
 Insolvency Working Group 41st Session Report, supra note 114, ¶¶ 37–38; Insolvency 
Working Group 41st Session Proposal, supra note 114, ¶¶ 14–17. 
 
117
 Insolvency Working Group 41st Session Report, supra note 114, ¶ 38. 
 
118
 Insolvency Working Group 39th Session Report, supra note 100, ¶ 24. 
 
119
 JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 24, at 7 (“[A]ny court considering legislation based on the 
Model Law is likely to find the international jurisprudence of assistance to its interpretation.”). 
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 This desire to effect uniformity in the law forms a context 
for courts of implementing states, and their decisions,
121
 to be heightened 
persuasive authorities.
122
 And the desire for uniformity is present in 
Congress’ adoption of the Insolvency Model Law through Chapter 15 of the 
Code. 
 2. Congress Elected Harmonization of Chapter 15 with the 
Insolvency Model Law Statutes of Other Implementing States 
Congress adopted the Insolvency Model Law through Chapter 15 of 
the Code,
123
 and in doing so, Congress chose that the United States should 
be an implementing state.
124
 As such, the United States is a participant in 
the harmonization goals of the Insolvency Model Law.
125
 Indeed, Congress 
adopted Section 1508, a directive to consider the need for uniformity 
between the application of Chapter 15 and the application of the Insolvency 
Model Law as implemented in other countries. Section 1508 reads: “In 
interpreting this chapter [11 USCS §§ 1501 et seq.], the court shall consider 
its international origin, and the need to promote an application of this 
chapter that is consistent with the application of similar statutes adopted by 
foreign jurisdictions.”
126
 Section 1508 of the Code is the U.S.-equivalent of 
Article 8 of the Insolvency Model Law
127
 and commands U.S. courts to 
refer to non-U.S. sources when interpreting Chapter 15.
128
 The legislative 
history of Section 1508 points to a number of sources that can shed light on 
the intent behind the directive of the provision and provide a stepping stone 
in determining the authority to be placed on the decisions of fellow enacting 
courts that interpret the Insolvency Model Law. These non-U.S. sources 
include decisions rendered by implementing states that construe the 




 Additional evidence of the Model Law’s emphasis on a uniform approach is found in the 
Guide to Enactment which instructs implementing states on ways to avoid “compromise[ing] the goal of 
achieving uniformity and facilitating cross-border insolvency matters.” MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO 
ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 48. 
 
121
 See supra note 45. 
 
122
 Flanders, supra note 47, at 79. 
 
123
 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 105 (2005); see Part II, supra p. 10. 
 
124
 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 105–196, 106 n.101 (2005). 
 
125
 This point will be explored more below. 
 
126
 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (2012 & Supp. 2014). 
 
127
 Ramney-Marinelli, supra note 34, at 273 (2008); Ragan, supra note 7, at 134 (“[Section 1508] 
specifically commands U.S. courts interpreting chapter 15 to consult foreign sources.”). 
 
128
 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (“In interpreting this chapter [11 USCS §§ 1501 et seq.], the court 
shall consider its international origin, and the need to promote an application of this chapter [11 USCS 
§§ 1501 et seq.] that is consistent with the application of similar statutes adopted by foreign 
jurisdictions.”), with MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 5 (“In the interpretation 
of this Law, regard is to be had to its international origin and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith.”). 
36_2_4_CLEMENTS FINAL (DO NOT  DELETE) 3/14/2016  3:18 PM 
The Harmonizing Directive of Section 1508 
36:435 (2016) 
453 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Guide to 




As explored in Part III.B.1 above, the Guide to Enactment explains 
that Article 8’s purpose is to create an interest in its harmonized 
interpretation in enacting countries.
130
 Since the legislative history points to 
the Guide to Enactment, then the Guide’s commentary on Article 8 can 
illuminate the reasoning behind a country’s legislature that chooses to enact 
that particular provision.
131
 This is just what Congress instructs: the Guide 
to Enactment should be turned to for guidance on the meaning and purpose 
of Chapter 15’s provisions.
132
 
It follows that when Congress enacted the Insolvency Model Law it 
understood Article 8’s purpose and selected to enact it in order to create an 
interest in its harmonized interpretation in the United States.
133
 This point is 
particularly powerful when considering the nature of the Insolvency Model 
Law and its flexibility in adaption into the legal systems of enacting 
countries.
134
 Congress had the choice to modify Article 8 of the Insolvency 
Model Law, but opted not to and adopted Article 8’s directive through 
Section 1508.
135
    
Through Section 1508, Congress instructs U.S. courts to refer to the 
court decisions of fellow Insolvency Model Law countries that interpret the 
Insolvency Model Law in order to promote uniform interpretation.
136
 In 
other words, U.S. courts should aim to harmonize rulings on the 




 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 109–10 (2005) (“Interpretation of this chapter on a uniform 
basis will be aided by reference to the Guide and the Reports cited therein, which explain the reasons for 
the terms used and often cite their origins as well. Uniform interpretation will also be aided by reference 
to CLOUT, the UNCITRAL Case Law on Uniform Texts, which is a service of UNCITRAL. CLOUT 
receives reports from national reporters all over the world concerning court decisions interpreting 
treaties, model laws, and other text promulgated by UNCITRAL.”). 
 
130
 See MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 54; General Assembly 30th 
Session Report, supra note 100, ¶ 174 (explaining the adoption of Article 8 to the Model Law); 
Insolvency Working Group 39th Session Report, supra note 100, ¶ 39 (“The importance of Article 8 to 
interpretation is noted in the decisions of a number of courts.”). 
 
131
 See MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 24 (informing that the Guide to 
Enactment is directed at legislators to assist in their preparation of enacting legislation).  
 
132
 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 106 n.101 (2005). 
 
133
 See id.; MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 5. 
 
134
 MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 25; JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra 
note 24, at 7 (“While the UNCITRAL Model Law emphasizes the desirability of a uniform approach to 
its interpretation based on its international origins, the domestic law of most States is likely to require 
interpretation in accordance with national law; unless the enacting State has endorsed the ‘international’ 
approach in its own legislation.”) (emphasis added). 
 
135
 MODEL LAW AND GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 5, at 25 (“In incorporating the text of a 
model law into its system, a State may modify or leave out some of its provisions.”). 
 
136
 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 109–10 (2005). 
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Insolvency Model Law countries.
137
 It is this very goal—uniformity in 
interpretation—that exalts the interpretative decisions of fellow Insolvency 
Model Law countries to heightened persuasive authority.
138
 When 
uniformity is sought and reference is made to other courts to determine 
what uniformity should look like, those other courts are serving a capacity 
that “goes beyond being merely ‘persuasive.’”
139
 They are being treated “as 
authorities by virtue of what they are, not only by what they say, and hence 
as [heightened] persuasive [authorities].”
140
 To put it another way, the “fact 
of convergence” will drive a court confronted with a question for the first 
time to reach the same decision and to come to a different conclusion only 
if it has “strong contrary feelings.”
141
 Congress alludes to this driving 
force—the pull of uniformity—in remarking that the decisions of U.S. 
courts will “more likely be regarded as persuasive elsewhere” to the extent 
that they rely on the case law of implementing states.
142
 To achieve this 
consideration for harmonization, U.S. courts are aided by a number of non-
U.S. sources when interpreting Chapter 15.
143
 These sources include the 
Guide to Enactment and the reports of UNCITRAL’s Working Group on 
Insolvency Laws, which are referenced in the Guide to Enactment as well 
as in decisions rendered by foreign courts construing the Insolvency Model 
Law.
144
 Congress labeled these sources as not just persuasive, but also as 
advancing the “crucial goal of uniformity of interpretation.”
145
 
 C. Proper Treatment of Foreign Case Law Under Section 1508 
Since the case law of implementing states holds heightened persuasive 
authority, then such case law should receive treatment commensurate with 
this authority in the form of acknowledgement and rebuttal, if applicable, 
by U.S. courts.
146







 See Flanders, supra note 47, at 82. 
 
139






 Id. (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 349 (2008)). 
 
142
 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 110 (2005). 
 
143
 Id. at 109 (explaining that “[i]nterpretation of this chapter [15] will be aided by reference [to 
several categories of non-U.S. sources]”); Ramney-Marinelli, supra note 34, at 273. 
 
144
 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 109–10 (2005); Ramney-Marinelli, supra note 34, at 273. 
 
145
 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 110 (2005); cf. Explanatory Memorandum, Cross-Border 
Insolvency Bill 2008 (Cth) 6 (Austrl.) (“It is expected that international jurisprudence on key concepts in 
the Model Law will assist Australian courts with any interpretative tasks that may arise in relation to the 
Cross-Border Insolvency Bill.”). 
 
146
 Cf. Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 512–
13 (2003) (“Given that the intention of such [international] treaties [like the U.N. Convention of 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods] is to provide for uniform rules, the failure of courts to 
consider how sister signatories have interpreted the treaty undermines the very purpose of the treaty 
regime. Accordingly, an antiparochial, prodialogic rule that would foster international cooperation and 
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courts. The second step is to explain why such case law is not followed if 
the U.S. court deviates from it. 
In fact, where a goal of uniformity in the law exists—as in the context 
of heightened persuasive authority—case law from other jurisdictions 
cannot be ignored.
147
 “[U]niformity can only be achieved if . . . foreign case 
law [is considered].”
148
 Indeed, the concept of harmonization itself, when 
based on a model law, necessarily dictates a review of the case law of other 
countries.
149
 This point is reinforced when considering Section 1508’s 
predecessor in Article 7 of the CISG.
150
 Numerous scholars agree that 




compliance with international law would be that national courts interpreting international law should 
consider relevant decisions of foreign courts interpreting the same treaty of principle of customary 
international law and should not depart from those precedents without articulating clear reasons for 
doing so.”).  
 
147
 Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a Canon of Domestic Statutory 
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1112 (1990) (“[C]ourts . . . faced with issues of statutory 
construction are obliged to consult international sources, culling norms from aspirations and interpreting 
a variety of texts and state practices.”); see Sullivan, supra note 62, at 1201 (“[J]udicial decisions, even 
if not binding, should be looked to simply because they are judicial decisions. Judges are expected to 
look to precedents—even merely persuasive ones. . . . [F]ailure to take even nonbinding precedent into 
account is “bad form.”); see also James Gordley, Comparative Legal Research: Its Function in the 
Development of Harmonized Law, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 555, 560 (1995) (“The case for a transnational 
approach to [legal problems] is clearest when jurists of different nations are not only confronting the 
same problem but their codes or case law give them the same guidance or lack of guidance as to how to 
solve it.”) (emphasis added). In this case, both the U.S. and foreign jurisdictions will be interpreting the 
Insolvency Model Law. 
 
148
 Ferrari, supra note 106, at 254 (“The interpreter must consider decisions rendered by judicial 
bodies of foreign jurisdictions, because it is possible that the same or similar questions have already 
been examined by other States’ courts.”); see Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 732–33 (1998) (“Implicit in the required deference to uniformity is an 




 Hammer & McClintock, supra note 1, at 259 (“Chapter 15 instructs U.S. courts that, to the 
extent possible, they should harmonize their rulings with relevant prior decisions of foreign courts. This 
mandate is contained in section 1508 . . . .”). Indeed, the U.S. Courts’ “Bankruptcy Basics” online 
publication clearly expresses this thought in the context of Chapter 15: “Because of the UNCITRAL 
source for chapter 15, the U.S. interpretation must be coordinated with the interpretation given by other 
countries that have adopted it as internal law to promote a uniform and coordinated legal regime for 
cross-border insolvency cases.” Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter15.aspx (citing 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1520(c)) (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
 
150
 See supra Part III.B.1. 
 
151
 See, e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Contemplating a Civil Law Paradigm for a Future International 
Commercial Code, 65 LA. L. REV. 677, 747 (2005) (“Many scholars conclude that Article 7(1)’s 
requirement for international interpretation necessitates that domestic courts at least consider foreign 
CISG decisions.”); Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (1993) (“Article 
7(1) requires at the very least that tribunals in one contracting state consider the opinions of tribunals in 
other contracting states.”); John Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action—Uniform International 
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Similarly, Section 1508 requires U.S. courts to consider the case law of 
countries that have implemented the Insolvency Model Law.
152
 As with 
other heightened persuasive authority, U.S. courts are not required to follow 
heightened persuasive authorities, but if a U.S. court determines that the 
case law of an implementing state should not be followed, then the court 
must clearly explain when it deviated from the foreign case law.
153
 
 IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF FOREIGN CASE LAW IN 
INTERPRETING CHAPTER 15  
Although Section 1508 provides for the treatment of the case law of 
implementing states as heightened persuasive authority and thus requires 
consulting such case law, one can anticipate that such treatment of 
implementing states’ case law will face opposition.
154
 However, limitations 
on the use of implementing states’ case law address this potential 
opposition as is discussed further in this Part. For the purposes of this Note, 
the arguments will be limited in scope to those that remain in light of a 
statutory mandate to consult foreign sources.
155
 The scope is limited as such 
because many commentators agree that consideration of foreign sources is 
appropriate if a statute directs it
156
 and because doing so keeps the 





Words: Uniform Application?, 8 J.L. & COM. 207, 211 (1988) (“In view of the mandate in Article 7(1) 
for interpretation with regard to the Convention’s ‘international character’ and ‘the need to promote 
uniformity in its application,’ courts in States that adopt the Sales Convention should have no doubt as 
to their responsibility to consider interpretations in other countries.”). 
 
152
 See supra Part III.A.1 for a more detailed explanation of the heightened persuasive treatment 
of case law. 
 
153
 Id.; see Ferrari, supra note 106, at 260 (“Foreign case law should be used as a source from 
which to draw either arguments or counterarguments. Thus, it can be helpful in solving a specific 
problem.”) (emphasis added). 
 
154
 Ragan, supra note 7, at 162. 
 
155




 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address at the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts (Apr. 2, 2004), in 
98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305, 305 (2004) (stating that one cannot say the use of foreign law in 
determining the meaning of U.S. statutes is never appropriate and outlining three contexts in which it is 
appropriate, including a statute designed to implement the obligations of the U.S. under a treaty and a 
statute which directly or indirectly refers to foreign law). 
 
157
 See generally Roger P. Alford, “Outsourcing Authority?” Citation to Foreign Court Precedent 
in Domestic Jurisprudence: Four Mistakes in the Debate on “Outsourcing Authority,” 69 ALB. L. REV. 
653 (2006); Zachary Larsen, Discounting Foreign Imports: Foreign Authority in Constitutional 
Interpretation & the Curb of Popular Sovereignty, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 767 (2009); Diarmiud F. 
O’Scannlain, Speech: What Role Should Foreign Practice and Precedent Play in the Interpretation of 
Domestic Law?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1893 (2005); Viad F. Perju, The Puzzling Parameters of the 
Foreign Law Debate, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 167; Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law 
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Perhaps, some might argue, the immediate issue of a heightened 
persuasive-authority approach to foreign case law is relinquishing the 
primacy of American law.
158
 But “this drastically overstates the 
situation.”
159
 Viewing foreign case law interpreting the Insolvency Model 
Law as heightened persuasive authority under Section 1508 does not allow 
other countries to establish laws for domestic application; rule-making 
power is not abdicated.
160
 Rather, the approach “recognizes the [strong] 
persuasive value that exists in [fellow enacting courts’] interpretations of 
the same (or similar) statutory texts.”
161
 
This last phrase—“same or similar”—holds particular importance in 
the heightened persuasive-authority approach to foreign case law under 
Section 1508. To argue that all foreign case law that interprets the 
Insolvency Model Law should be afforded the weight of heightened 
persuasive authority would be over-reaching.
162
 A more nuanced analysis is 
required.  Section 1508 directs courts to consider “the need to promote an 
application of [Chapter 15] that is consistent with the application of similar 
statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions” in interpreting the Code.
163
 To that 
end, courts must first determine whether the provisions of Chapter 15 under 
interpretative question are similar to those in the corresponding statute of 
the fellow Insolvency Model Law country whose case law is under 
consideration.
164
 Only those cases in which both the U.S. and foreign 
provisions are based on the Insolvency Model Law should be considered 
“similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions” for purposes of Section 
1508. 
The analysis does not end there, however. Even when both provisions 
are adopted from the Model Law, they may contain differences in language.  
If that is the case, the court must determine whether the differences are 
merely grammatical or linguistic as opposed to substantive.
165
 Also, the 
court should consider whether the change in language reflects a disciplined 
rejection of the Insolvency Model Law for policy reasons.
166
 Only if the 
 
in Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. L. REV. 653 (2009); Pradyumna K. Tripathi, Foreign 
Precedents and Constitutional Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (1957). 
 
158
 See Chung, supra note 42, at 104 (arguing that “Section 1508 opens the door wide for the 
introduction of foreign law and moves the courts away from the primacy of American law”). 
 
159
 Boss, supra note 80, at 279.  
 
160
 Ragan, supra note 7, at 163. 
 
161
 See id. at 163; see also Boss, supra note 80, at 279–80 (explaining the notion that the Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act “should be interpreted with due deference to its origin in the Model Law 




 See Boss, supra note 80, at 288. 
 
163
 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (2012 & Supp. 2014) (emphasis added). 
 
164






 Id.; see, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 110 (2005) (explaining both language changes 
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changes are merely grammatical, and are not substantive nor reflective of a 
policy-based rejection, are the provisions similar for the purposes of Section 
1508.
167
 Only then is uniform interpretation crucial,
168
 and only then can the 
case law interpreting the similar provisions be heightened persuasive 
authority. 
Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.) 
provides a look at a court engaging in the task of determining whether 
statutes are similar for the purposes of Section 1508.
169
 The issue in 
Morning Mist Holdings was where the debtor had its “center of main 
interests” within the meaning of Section 1517(b)(1) of the Code.
170
 The 
answer to the question determined whether the debtor was eligible to 
receive the protection of Chapter 15, in which event U.S. proceedings 
against the debtor would be stayed.
171
 The Second Circuit noted that the 
UNCITRAL Guide to Enactment for the Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency does not define the center of main interests.
172
 The absence of 
this definition led the court to consider the European Union Convention on 
Insolvency Proceedings, from which the Insolvency Model Law drew the 
concept.
173
   
Ultimately, however, the court concluded that EU Regulation does not 
operate as an analog to Chapter 15 due to procedural differences; therefore, 
the court did not find the EU’s definition of center of main interests a 
suitable source of authority, persuasive or otherwise.
174
 The court also 
looked at relevant European case law from England and Wales but found 




and procedural changes to align the Model Law with the U.S. federal system. “This section implements 
the purpose of article 9 of the Model Law . . . . It varies the language to fit United States procedural 
requirements and it imposes recognition of the foreign proceeding as a condition to further rights and 
duties of the foreign representative. The goal is to concentrate control of these questions in one court.  
That goal is important in a Federal system like that of the United States with many different courts, state 
and federal, that may have pending actions involving the debtor or the debtor’s property.”). 
 
167
 The Judicial Perspective recognizes this concept in its introduction: “Recognizing that some 
enacting States have amended the Model Law to suit local circumstances, different approaches might be 
required if a judge concludes that the omission or modification of a particular article from the text as 
enacted necessitates such a course.” JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 24, at 1. This statement 
concerns deviating from the published course of action contained in the Judicial Perspective, but the 
same idea holds for deviating from the case law of a fellow Model Law country when the provisions 
being interpreted by the case law are similar to those in Chapter 15. 
 
168
 See Boss, supra note 80, at 288. 
 
169
 See generally Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 714 F.3d 127 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
 
170












 Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 714 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 
2013) (stating that “[the EU Regulation] is not a fit for construing Chapter 15”). 
 
175
 Id. at 136–37 (stating that the European case law focuses on those elements of the EU 
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As the Morning Mist Holdings case illustrates, employing a heightened 
persuasive-authority approach to foreign case law under Section 1508 does 
not relinquish the primacy of U.S. law. In Morning Mist Holdings, the court 
declined to find foreign case law persuasive due to a lack of similarity 
between Chapter 15 and its counterparts in the EU, England, and Wales. 
Although a heightened persuasive-authority approach to foreign case law 
under Section 1508 obliges courts who do not follow the case law of fellow 
enacting countries with similar statutes to provide an acknowledgement of 
the case law and to explain why they did not follow it, ultimately, U.S. 
courts are free to do just that.
176
 Heightened persuasive authority is not 
binding, and courts can choose not to follow it. 
 V. ANALYZING DE AKERS EX REL. SAAD INVESTMENS CO. 
LTD. V. DEPUTY COMM’R 
Akers presents an Insolvency Model Law interpretation issue which is 
could easily arise in the United States.
177
 The case is presented here as a 
type of case study, aimed at highlighting case law of a fellow enacting 
jurisdiction which interprets provisions of the Insolvency Model Law. 
In Akers, the Federal Court of Australia confronted on appeal the issue 
of whether to allow a local creditor, the Tax Commissioner, to pursue a 
claim for a debt unenforceable in the Cayman Islands, the debtor’s center of 
main interests and the jurisdiction of the main insolvency proceeding.
178
 
The claim was enforceable in Australia, the forum of recognition and the 
jurisdiction applying the Insolvency Model Law.
179
 The crux of the issue 
was that the Tax Commissioner’s claim would not be accepted under the 
Cayman Islands wind-up law
180
 because to do so would be to enforce 
foreign revenue laws in the Cayman Islands.
181
 
Essentially, the question was whether the court, in its 2013 decision to 
modify recognition orders, properly granted relief from the stay under 
Article 22 of the CBI.
182
 That relief allowed the Tax Commission to recover 
 
Regulation’s definition of center of main interests). 
 
176
 Compare this line of reasoning with the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.  Zimmerman v. Oregon 
Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1184 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We realize that our decision creates an inter-
circuit split of authority. We are hesitant to create such a split, and we do so only after the most 
painstaking inquiry.”).  
 
177
 See De Akers ex rel. Saad Invs. Co. Ltd. v Deputy Comm’r of Taxation [2014] FCAFC 57, ¶ 
115 (Austl.) (musing that “other examples of debt [under these circumstances] are not difficult to 
hypothesise.” The particular circumstances are those in which a claim is enforceable under the forum of 
recognition applying the Model Law yet unenforceable in the foreign main proceeding.). 
 
178






 See supra note 4 for an explanation of the relation of wind-up law to insolvency law.  
 
181
 De Akers [2014] FCAFC ¶ 3. 
 
182
 Id. ¶ 79. 
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its tax debt from the debtor’s Australian assets.
183
 The issue centered on the 
relationship between Article 20 and Article 22 of the Cross-Border 
Insolvency Act (CBI), Australia’s adoption of the Model Law,
184
 and 
whether Article 22 could vary the automatic stay granted by Article 20 
through recognition of the foreign proceeding by the Australian courts.
185
 
The Court found that Article 22, specifically provision 22(3), applies only 
to relief under Articles 19 or 21; yet, the Court found that a provision of 
Article 20 itself, 20(2), permitted modification to relief under Article 20, 
and the Court determined that the court below considered this provision in 
its 2013 decision to modify the recognition orders.
186
 Thus, the Court held 
that the Insolvency Model Law permitted modification and termination of 
the mandatory effects of foreign recognition granted under it.
187
 This ruling 
essentially favors a local creditor who considers that its position is 
disadvantaged in the forum of the main proceeding.
188
 The Court went on to 
state in dicta that “it is fundamental in any society that its government is 
able to require its citizens and others who operate a business or reside 
within that society, to pay taxation so as to maintain the State.”
189
 
The way the Australian court ruled on this could have substantial 
implications for U.S. courts confronting a similar scenario.
190
 Specifically, 
if a local tax creditor in the United States cannot collect under a foreign 
main proceeding, this case potentially opens a line of reasoning for U.S. 
courts to provide relief for that creditor to levy against the debtor’s assets in 
the United States.
191
 This follows because Australia has adopted the 









 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) pt 1 (Austl.).  
 
185
 De Akers [2014] FCAFC ¶ 79. Article 20 reads in relevant part: “Paragraph 1 (a) of the present 
article does not affect the right to commence individual actions or proceedings to the extent necessary to 
preserve a claim against the debtor.” Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) sch 1 ch 3 art 20(3) 
(Austl.).  Article 22 reads in relevant part: (1) In granting or denying relief under article 19 or 21, or in 
modifying or terminating relief under paragraph 3 of the present article, the court must be satisfied that 
the interests of the creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor, are adequately protected. 
(2) The court may subject relief granted under article 19 or 21 to conditions it considers appropriate. (3) 
The court may, at the request of the foreign representative or a person affected by relief granted under 
article 19 or 21, or at its own motion, modify or terminate such relief. Id. sch 1 ch 3 art 22.  
 
186
 De Akers [2014] FCAFC ¶¶ 80, 86–87. 
 
187






 De Akers [2014] FCAFC ¶ 77. 
 
190
 See Stefano Calabretta, Federal Court of Australia Upholds Landmark Cross Border 
Insolvency Decision, PIPER ALDERMAN (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=1d09fe75-873e-4194-aec4-d7c036d2ede2 (commenting that “[i]t will be interesting to 
observe how Courts approach similar applications in the future . . . .”); Atkins, supra note 183. 
 
191
 See Atkins, supra note 183. 
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Insolvency Model Law country;
192
 therefore, the provisions of the 
Insolvency Model Law, which the Australian court interpreted, implicate 
provisions of Chapter 15 of the Code.
193
 Article 20 of the CBI coincides 
with Section 1520 of the Code, and Article 22 of the CBI coincides with 
Section 1522 of the Code.
194
 Therefore, the Akers case presents the situation 
of a fellow enacting country interpreting sections of the Insolvency Model 
Law. If, and when, such sections of the Insolvency Model Law via Chapter 
15 of the Code come under questions of interpretation in the United States, 
courts must be prepared to determine what weight to place on the Akers 
decision in order to comply with Section 1508’s directive for consistent 
application. 
If differences between Sections 1520 and 1522 of the Code and 
Articles 20 and 22 of the CBI are not substantive or policy-based rejections, 
then the provisions are similar for the purposes of Section 1508. In that 
event, Akers is to be treated as heightened persuasive authority by U.S. 
courts interpreting Sections 1520 and 1522 of the Code. 
Article 20 under the CBI reads exactly as Article 20 of the Model 
Law.
195
 Article 20 provides in relevant part:  
Effects of recognition of a foreign main proceeding 
1. Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding that is a foreign  
main proceeding: 
a) Commencement or continuation of individuals actions or 
individual proceedings concerning the debtor’s assets, 
rights, obligations or liabilities is stayed; 
b) Execution against the debtor’s assets is stayed; 
c) The right to transfer, encumber or otherwise dispose of 




 See supra note 15. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law provides for adopting states to modify or omit existing 
provisions, or include new provisions. UNCITRAL recommends that an adopting state make 
as few changes as possible to the text of the UNCITRAL Model Law when enacting it. 
Australia has followed this approach, with the anticipated advantage that international 
jurisprudence and experience in interpreting and dealing with the UNCITRAL Model Law 
will assist Australian courts to interpret the provisions of the [Insolvency Model Law]. 
Ian Walker & Minter Ellison, Australia Adopts UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 




 See Buckel, supra note 1, at 1293 (“Chapter 15 incorporates the majority of the Model Law 
verbatim, thus ‘parallel[ing] the procedural law of all adopting nations.’”) (citing Beckering, supra note 
35, at 300). 
 
194
 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 114–16 (2005) (describing the relationship of Section 1520 
to Article 20 of the Model Law and Section 1522 to Article 22 of the Model Law); Explanatory 
Memorandum, Cross-Border Insolvency Bill 2008 (Cth) 6 (Austl.) (“The Bill adopts the Model Law will 
as few changes as are necessary to adapt it to the Australian context.”). 
 
195
 Explanatory Memorandum, Cross-Border Insolvency Bill 2008 (Cth) 26–27 (Austl.). 
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2.   The scope, and the modification or termination, of the stay and 
suspension referred to in paragraph 1 of the present article are 
subject to [refer to any provisions of law of the enacting State 
relating to insolvency that apply to exceptions, limitations, 
modifications or termination in respect of the stay and suspension 
referred to in paragraph 1 of the present article].
196
 
Article 20’s mandatory relief is limited by paragraph 2 of Article 20, 
which incorporates domestic law into the Model Law.
197
 In Australia, 
Chapter 5 of the Corporations Act and the Bankruptcy Act are the relevant 
sources of domestic law.
198
 
Section 1520 of the Code provides in relevant part as follows: 
Effects of recognition of a foreign main proceeding 
a) Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding that is a foreign 
main proceeding— 
1) Section 361 and 362 apply with respect to the 
debtor and the property of the debtor that is within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States; 
2) Sections 363, 549, and 552 apply to a transfer of an 
interest of the debtor in property that is within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States to the 
same extent that the sections would apply to 
property of an estate; 
3) Unless the court orders otherwise, the foreign 
representative may operate the debtor’s business 
and may exercise the rights and powers of a trustee 
under and to the same extent provided by sections 
363 and 552; and 
4) Section 552 applies to property of the debtor that is 




As Article 20 of the CBI and Section 1520 of the Code are not word-
for-word copies of each other, the differences must be understood before a 
determination as to the similarity of the provisions can be made. Since 
Article 20 mirrors the language of the Model Law, the language of Section 
1520 must be examined. The legislative history of Section 1520 informs 




 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) sch 1 ch 3 art 20 (Austl.).   
 
197
 Cf. Explanatory Memorandum, Cross-Border Insolvency Bill 2008 (Cth) 11 (Austl.). 
(“Paragraph 2 of article 20 of the Model Law allows for the scope, and the modification or termination, 
of the stay that comes into effect upon recognition of a foreign proceeding to be made subject to 






 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a) (2012 & Supp. 2014). 
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Chapter 15 of the Code through the Code’s other provisions.
200
 Indeed, 
Section 1520(a)(1) incorporates Article 20(1)(a) and (b) because Section 
362 of the Code imposes the “restrictions required by those two 
subsections.”
201
 Sections 1520(a)(2) and (4) apply the Code provision “that 
impose the restrictions” required by Article 20(1)(c) of the Model Law.
202
 
Also, by incorporating Sections 362 and 363 of the Code, Section 1520(a) 
accomplishes Article 20(2)’s inclusion of domestic law to limit the 
mandatory relief of Article 20.
203
 
Article 22 of the CBI provides as follows: 
Protection of creditors and other interested persons 
1) In granting or denying relief under article 19 or 21, or in 
modifying or terminating relief under paragraph 3 of the 
present article, the court must be satisfied that the interests 
of the creditors and other interested persons, including the 
debtor, are adequately protected. 
2) The court may subject relief granted under article 19 or 21 
to conditions it considers appropriate. 
3) The court may, at the request of the foreign representative or 
a person affected by relief granted under article 19 or 21, or 
at its own mtion, modify or terminate such relief.
204
 
Section 1522 of the Code reads in relevant part as follows: 
Protection of creditors and other interested persons 
a) The court may grant relief under section 1519 or 1521, or 
may modify or terminate relief under subsection (c), only if 
the interests of the creditors and other interested entities, 
including the debtor, are sufficiently protected. 
b) The court may subject relief granted under section 1519 or 
1521, or the operation of the debtor’s business under section 
1520(a)(3), to conditions it considers appropriate, including 
the giving of security or the filing of a bond. 
c) The court may, at the request of the foreign representative or 
an entity affected by relief granted under section 1519 or 














 Id. (“In both cases, the provisions are broader and more compete than those contemplated by 






  Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) sch 1 ch 3 art 22 (Austl.). 
 
205
  11 U.S.C. § 1522(a)-(c) (2012 & Supp. 2014). 
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language of the Model Law, the language of Section 1522 must be 
examined. The legislative history explains that Section 1522 “follows 
article 22 of the Model Law with changes for U.S. usage and references to 
relevant Bankruptcy Code sections.”
206
 However, a difference in word 
choice exists with respect to Section 1522’s adoption of Article 22(1)—the 
use of “sufficiently”
207
 rather than “adequately.”
208
 Section 1522’s 
legislative history reveals that the change in wording was intentionally and 
done so “to avoid confusion with a very specialized legal term in U.S. 
bankruptcy, ‘adequate protection.’”
209
 Therefore, it does not seem that the 
change in wording was done to change the substance of the provision or for 
a policy reason. 
Although the relevant provisions of the CBI and the Code contain 
grammatical differences and differences in language, these differences do 
not reflect substantive changes nor policy-oriented decisions to depart from 
the Model Law. Indeed, the legislative history of Sections 1520 and 1522 
indicates that the provisions are meant to reflect the requirements of 
Articles 20 and 22 of the Model Law, and Articles 20 and 22 of the CBI 
adopts the Articles 20 and 22 of the Model Law verbatim.
210
 Therefore, the 
Australian provisions are similar for the purposes of Section 1508. 
Thus, when interpreting Section 1520 or 1522, a U.S. court should 
look to the Akers’ decision as heightened persuasive authority. This does 
not mean the decision is binding; rather, the U.S. court is free to choose 
whether to follow the interpretative rulings of the Australian court. 
However, if the U.S. court decides not to follow Akers, it should 
acknowledge the case and offer a rebuttal, showing why it decided not to 
follow the decision of a fellow enacting court whose authority is of 
heightened persuasiveness. 
 VI. PRACTICAL ISSUES IN THE USE OF FOREIGN CASE LAW 
Because implementing states’ case law should be considered by U.S. 
courts in issues of interpretation under Chapter 15, “[a]ccess to information 
about the application of the [Insolvency Model Law] in jurisdictions around 
the world is thus of key importance.”
211
 While judges of U.S. courts may be 




  H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 116 (2005). 
 
207
  11 U.S.C. § 1522(a). 
 
208
  Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) sch 1 ch 3 art 22(1) (Austl.).  
 
209
  H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 115 (2005). 
 
210
 See id. at 114–16; Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) sch 1 ch 3 arts 20 22 (Austl.).   
 
211
 U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], FACTS ABOUT CLOUT: CASE LAW ON 
UNCITRAL TEXTS (2013), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/brochure/Facts_about_Clout_eng_ 
Ebook.pdf [hereinafter CLOUT FACTS]. 
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 these hurdles can be overcome through smart use of 
technology and the zealous representation of attorneys and foreign 
representatives in insolvency proceedings. 
Understanding the importance of access to the case law of 
implementing states, the United Nations established the CLOUT system 
(Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts) in 1988 to facilitate uniform 
interpretation and application of UNCITRAL texts by collecting 
information on relevant court decisions in countries applying those texts.
213
  
The CLOUT system is designed to enable and encourage users to consider 
the decisions of courts in other countries.
214
 The database includes case law 
on the Insolvency Model Law.
215
 Access to CLOUT is online, free, 
unlimited, and open to the public.
216
 
Central to CLOUT is its compilation and organization of case 
abstracts, which highlight key issues in the application and interpretation of 
UNCITRAL texts.
217
  Abstracts are available in each of the United Nations’ 
six official languages, including English.
218
 The abstracts are designed to 
present enough information for users to discern whether examination of the 
complete case is useful.
219
 The abstracts usually contain the following 
information:  
(1) the reasons for applying or interpreting the provision of the 
UNCITRAL text in the way that it is interpreted, including any 
specific reliance on a principle or other provision of that text, on 
previous case law, or on relevant contract clauses and particular 
facts; (2) the claim or relief sought by the claimant and any other fact 
describing the procedural context within which the case was decided; 




 See Ferrari, supra note 106, at 254 (“[R]equiring interpreters to consider foreign decisions 
creates practical difficulties, for two main reasons: (1) foreign case law is not readily available, i.e., it 
cannot easily be retrieved; and (2) even where it can be retrieved, it is often written in a language 
unknown to the interpreter.”). 
 
213
 Id.; U. N. Comm. on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts 
(CLOUT) User Guide, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.C/GUIDE/1/Rev.2 (June 2, 2010) [hereinafter 
CLOUT User Guide]. 
 
214
 CLOUT User Guide, supra note 213, ¶ 2. 
 
215
 CLOUT FACTS, supra note 211. As of August 26, 2015, CLOUT contains eighty-nine cases 
which interpret the Insolvency Model Law from eight implementing states. Id. 
 
216
 See id.; Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT), U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW 
[UNCITRAL], http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2015). 
 
217
 CLOUT FACTS, supra note 211. 
 
218
 CLOUT User Guide, supra note 213, ¶ 5. 
 
219
 Id. ¶ 17 (“In view of the necessity for brevity, the substantive part of the abstract is ordinarily 
not a complete summary of the full decision or award but should suffice as a ‘pointer’ to the specific 
issues concerning the application and interpretation of the relevant UNCITRAL text in a given decision 
or arbitral award.”). 
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Additionally, the case abstract indicates if a translation of the case into 
a language other than its original is available and if notes or commentaries 
on the case exist.
221
 
New abstracts are generally added to CLOUT every month.
222
  
CLOUT relies on a network of national correspondents who are designated 
by their respective implementing states.
223
 National correspondents monitor 
and collect court decisions and prepare abstracts of relevant cases, which 
the U.N. Secretariat translates into the five other U.N. languages.
224
 
Cases relevant for inclusion on CLOUT are those that interpret or 
apply a particular provision of the text and those cases that relate to the text 
in general, such as decisions that hold that a text is not applicable.
225
 In 
compiling cases for publication on CLOUT, priority is given to final court 
decisions, but if the courts’ reasoning at the lower and appellate levels is 
relevant to the interpretation of an UNCITRAL text, then abstracts for both 
decisions may be included in CLOUT.
226
 However, if a decision on CLOUT 




Through CLOUT, judges, law clerks, and practitioners (including 
attorneys and foreign representatives in insolvency proceedings) along with 
other interested parties and the public have access to the most relevant case 
law which interprets the Insolvency Model Law.
228
 Parties can use CLOUT 
to search for cases which interpret a particular provision of the Insolvency 
Model Law. Searches can be conducted by article of the Insolvency Model 
Law, keyword, and country among others.
229
 Reviewing the abstracts on 
cases related to the issue at question can uncover those case which require a 
full review.
230
 The citations of cases are provided with the abstracts for 




 Id. ¶ 18. 
 
221
 Id. ¶ 16. 
 
222
 CLOUT FACTS, supra note 211. 
 
223
 CLOUT User Guide, supra note 213, ¶ 4. As of August 13, 2015, the United States has three 
national correspondents, all law professors. U. N. Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, List of CLOUT National 
Correspondents – July 2015, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.C/Correspondents/1/ (2015) (on file with author).  
 
224
 CLOUT User Guide, supra note 213, ¶ 5. 
 
225
 Id. ¶ 8. 
 
226






 Id. ¶ 2 (“The purpose of the system is to promote international awareness of such legal texts .  
to enable judges, arbitrators, lawyers, parties to commercial transactions and other interested persons 
to take decisions and awards relating to those texts into account in dealing with matters within their 




 See U. N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], supra note 216. 
 
230
 See CLOUT User Guide, supra note 213, ¶ 17. 
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Secretariat upon request.  
Thus, when confronted by an issue of interpretation under Chapter 15, 
judges have options for ensuring their proper consideration of relevant case 
law of implementing states as Section 1508 directs. First, judges and their 
law clerks can use CLOUT to search for cases which interpret a particular 
provision of the Insolvency Model Law. Also, attorneys representing the 
debtor or other interested parties in a Chapter 15 case can also use CLOUT 
to find case law for use in crafting their arguments on the proper 
interpretation of a provision of Chapter 15.
231
 Further, a judge can require 
counsel to submit memoranda which focus on the particular interpretive 
issue and address all relevant case law of implementing states.
232
 The 
submission of memoranda by counsel can facilitate a judge’s understanding 
of the issue and the foreign case law on the matter.
233
 
If review of CLOUT abstracts leads to the need for review of a full 
decision that is not available in English, the judge may have the document 
translated by a qualified translator. However, given tight judicial budgets, a 
judge might be better served by requiring submission of a memorandum or 
memoranda on the issue and requiring that counsel provided translated 
copies of case law referenced in the memoranda to the court.
234
 Judges can 
utilize both technology and capable legal practitioners to ensure their proper 
consideration of relevant case law by implementing states. Indeed, “[t]he 
excuse that a court cannot be expected to take cognizance of foreign 
decisions because of linguistic barriers, time constraints, and access 
constraints should not be accepted.”
235
 This is particularly the case in the 
(still) early years of the Insolvency Model Law when it is crucial to develop 
a body of case law if it is truly to become the kind of harmonized 






 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“As advocate, a 
lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”). It follows that if 
lawyers know that a judge considers foreign case law under section 1508’s directive, then lawyers, in the 




 DAVID F. HERR ET AL., MOTION PRACTICE 5-5 (6th ed. 2015) (explaining in general that “a 
memorandum may be voluntarily submitted by a lawyer, requested by the judge, or required by local 
court rule”).  
 
233
 Id.  
 
234
 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1515(d) (2012 & Supp. 2014) (“The documents [required for a petition for 
recognition under Chapter 15] shall be translated into English. The court may require a translation into 
English of additional documents.”). 
 
235
 Monica Kilian, CISG and the Problem with Common Law Jurisdictions, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
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 VII. CONCLUSION 
The Insolvency Model Law operates on the notion of harmonization of 
interpretation. Harmonization represents a dense network of checking and 
rechecking results and building on one another’s work to create a solid and 
mutually reinforced consensus.
237
 It is a procedural manifestation of the 
adage “the whole is more than the sum of its parts.”
238
 In adopting the 
Insolvency Model Law in Chapter 15 of the Code, Congress chose to center 
the United States’ approach to cross-border insolvency on the same notion 
of harmonization. The best way to achieve this goal and to maintain the 
spirit of Section 1508 is to afford additional weight to the decisions of 











 ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICA 10f-1045a. 
 
239
 See Flanders, supra note 47, at 82. 
